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Eight in the Eye
of a Political Storm:

Civil Cases in the Supreme Court’s October 2015 Term
Todd E. Pettys

T

he Court’s October 2015 Term was dominated by the news
of Justice Antonin Scalia’s unexpected death in February
2016 and by President Barack Obama’s unsuccessful battle
to persuade Senate Republicans to consider his nomination of
Chief Judge Merrick Garland, of the D.C. Circuit, to fill the
vacancy. The loss of Justice Scalia resulted in a handful of nonprecedent-setting affirmances by an equally divided Court.
Those splits came on the questions of whether the First Amendment bars public-sector unions from imposing mandatory fees
on non-member employees;1 whether Texas and other states
may successfully challenge the Obama Administration’s decision to defer deportation of a large number of noncitizens;2
whether to overrule Nevada v. Hall,3 the 1979 case in which the
Court held that a state may be sued without its consent in other
states’ courts;4 whether Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction to
adjudicate tort claims against non-members;5 and whether
spousal guarantors are “applicants” for credit within the meaning of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and are thus statutorily
authorized to sue creditors for marital discrimination.6
Four-four splits were, however, the exception rather than
the rule. Both while Justice Scalia remained on the Court and
continuing after his saddening death, the Court handed down
precedent-setting rulings on numerous issues of broad interest,
including the Court’s most significant ruling on abortion rights
in nearly a quarter of a century.
ABORTION

In one of the Term’s most closely watched cases, the justices
ruled 5-3 in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt7 that two provisions of a 2013 Texas abortion law violated women’s Fourteenth Amendment right to terminate their pregnancies before
fetal viability. The first was a requirement that any doctor performing abortions have admitting privileges at a hospital within
30 miles of the abortion facility. Prior Texas law had been more
lenient, requiring doctors either to have admitting privileges at
a “local” hospital or to have “a working arrangement” with a
physician who possessed such privileges. The second challenged provision required all abortion facilities to meet the minimal regulatory standards for ambulatory surgical centers.

Footnotes
1. Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).
2. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). The
Fifth Circuit had held that the states had standing to sue and that
the Administration’s actions likely violated the Administrative
Procedure Act. When granting certiorari, the Supreme Court
added the Take Care Clause to the mix. The Court’s ultimate
opinion stated only that the judgment below was “affirmed by an
equally divided Court.”
3. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
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Those requirements covered a broad array of matters, ranging
from the size of a clinic’s staff, to the square footage of the facility, to the traffic patterns between rooms, to facilities’ HVAC
systems, and more. Abortion clinics in Texas argued that, far
from advancing women’s health as Texas claimed, these two
requirements worked to women’s detriment by forcing many
clinics to close, thereby increasing the distances that many
abortion-seeking women would have to travel and increasing
the wait times for services at the remaining facilities.
The Court found both provisions unconstitutional under
the undue-burden standard famously adopted by a plurality of
the Court in 1992’s Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.8 Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer first
rejected Texas’s argument that the clinics’ claims were barred
by claim preclusion. (That portion of the Court’s ruling is summarized below under the “Federal Jurisdiction” heading.)
Turning to the merits, the Court clarified Casey’s undue-burden standard in three important ways. First, when evaluating
whether a law imposes an “undue” burden on women’s ability
to terminate pre-viability pregnancies, a court must evaluate
not only “the burdens a law imposes on abortion access,” but
also the degree to which the law yields benefits.9 Second, a
court must apply a more demanding standard of review than is
appropriate for run-of-the-mill economic legislation. Third,
rather than defer conclusively (or nearly so) to a legislature’s
factual findings, a court may place “considerable weight upon
evidence and argument presented in judicial proceedings.”10
Applying those principles here, the Court concluded that
both of the Texas law’s challenged provisions unconstitutionally imposed undue burdens on women’s right to terminate
their early pregnancies. In the majority’s view, the district court
had reasonably concluded that the admitting-privileges
requirement had not yielded any health benefits for women
and had forced many of the state’s clinics to close. Many doctors could not satisfy the requirement even if they wished to do
so, Justice Breyer said, due to such things as their geographic
distance from the nearest hospital or their inability to generate
the amount of business that many hospitals require in
exchange for the conferral of admitting privileges. With

4. Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277
(2016).
5. Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136
S. Ct. 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
6. Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).
7. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
8. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
9. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309.
10. Id. at 2310.

respect to the surgical-center requirement, the Court found
that it, too, would yield no notable benefits for women, yet
would reduce still further the number of abortion-performing
clinics in the state. Pre-viability abortion procedures are
extremely safe, Justice Breyer wrote, and any complications
typically arise after the woman has already left the facility.
Justice Thomas dissented, reiterating his longstanding
rejection of a constitutional right to abortion and charging the
majority with ratcheting up the undue-burden standard to
something approaching strict scrutiny. Joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas, Justice Alito dissented on the procedural grounds described under this summary’s “Federal
Jurisdiction” heading.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

tory Commission has been statu[T]he Court
torily authorized to regulate the
held that the
compensation that wholesale
market operators pay to large- department had
scale users of electricity for failed to provide
reducing their consumption dura reasoned
ing periods of heavy demand.
The Court held, 7-2, that the
explanation for
agency does have that authority.
changing its
Devotees of administrative law
will take at least passing interest interpretation of
the FLSA . . . .
in the Court’s treatment of
Chevron deference. The justices
all agreed that the relevant statutory provisions spoke unambiguously to the issue and that Chevron deference was thus
unwarranted.16 Justice Kagan (leading the majority) and Justice Scalia (leading the dissent) nevertheless disagreed about
what those statutory provisions unambiguously said.

Grateful to the Court for reminding us that our car dealerships’ service advisors might be paid partially or even entirely
on commission, we turn to Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro.11
At issue in that case was whether those service advisors are
entitled to overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act. In
2011—having taken the view for more than two decades that
service advisors were statutorily exempt from the FLSA’s overtime-pay benefits—the Department of Labor shifted course,
issuing a rule stating that service advisors did not fall within
that exemption and thus were entitled to overtime pay. Commission-paid service advisors at a Mercedes-Benz dealership
sued their employer, arguing that the dealership had unlawfully failed to pay them overtime when they worked more than
40 hours per week. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the service advisors, finding that the FLSA was ambiguous and that
the department’s interpretation of the statute was entitled to
Chevron deference.12 The Supreme Court vacated and
remanded. Led by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that the
department had failed to provide a reasoned explanation for
changing its interpretation of the FLSA and that the Ninth Circuit thus should not defer to that interpretation when discerning the statute’s requirements. The department’s failure to
explain its shift was especially troubling here, Justice Kennedy
said, “because of decades of industry reliance on the [d]epartment’s prior policy.”13 Joined by Justice Alito in dissent, Justice
Thomas agreed that deference was unwarranted but argued
that remand was unnecessary because service advisors are
“salesmen primarily engaged in the selling of services for automobiles” and thus fall squarely within the statutory exemption.14
Those seeking an introduction to the markets through
which the nation’s electric power is priced and distributed will
want to read FERC v. Electric Power Supply Association.15 The
chief issue in the case was whether the Federal Energy Regula-

In Evenwel v. Abbott,17 the eight-member Court rejected two
Texas voters’ claim that the Equal Protection Clause requires
states to apportion their state legislative districts based upon
the total number of eligible voters in each district, rather
than—as has long been the norm in Texas and across the country—upon each district’s total number of residents. Observing
on behalf of the majority that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires states to apportion their federal congressional districts
based upon total population, Justice Ginsburg concluded that
the same amendment does not “simultaneously prohibit[]
States from apportioning their own legislative districts on the
same basis.”18 She explained that, “[b]y ensuring that each representative is subject to requests and suggestions from the
same number of constituents, total-population apportionment
promotes equitable and effective representation.”19
Although Texas had defended its total-population model, it
also had argued that the Equal Protection Clause left it free to
decide whether to apportion its legislative districts based upon
total population or total number of eligible voters. The majority declined to say whether Texas could indeed shift to an eligible-voter model if it wished to do so. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas embraced Texas’s argument, concluding
that the Constitution gives states “significant leeway in apportioning their own districts to equalize total population, to
equalize eligible voters, or to promote any other principle consistent with a republican form of government.”20 Justice Alito
similarly concurred in the judgment. While stopping short of
saying whether he agreed with Justice Thomas’s conclusion, he
argued that the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment appor-

11. 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016).
12. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
13. Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2126.
14. Id. at 2129 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
15. 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016). They might also enjoy reading Hughes v.
Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016), a case
involving wholesale electricity transactions. The Court held in

Hughes that federal law preempted a Maryland regulatory program.
Compare Electric Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 773 n.5 with id.
at 785 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).
Id. at 1129.
Id. at 1132.
Id. at 1133 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).

EQUAL PROTECTION

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
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tions federal House seats based
upon total population does not
tell us anything meaningful about
whether states may apportion
their own legislative districts on a
different basis.
In Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,21
the Court unanimously rejected a
group of Arizona voters’ argument that the state’s newly drawn
legislative districts violated the
Equal Protection Clause. Under
the districting scheme adopted in
the wake of the 2010 census, most of Arizona’s Democrat-leaning districts were relatively underpopulated, and most of the
state’s Republican-leaning districts were relatively overpopulated. The population deviation between the largest and smallest districts was less than 10%, however, and so the law presented the challengers with an especially steep climb. Led by
Justice Breyer, the Court concluded that the small population
differences were the result of efforts by the state’s redistricting
commission “to achieve compliance with the federal Voting
Rights Act, not to secure political advantage for one party.”22
With Justice Kagan recused, the Court voted 4-3 in Fisher v.
University of Texas23 to uphold the University of Texas’s efforts
to increase racial diversity among its undergraduates. The university fills most of its entering class each year with Texas students who were within the top 10% of their high schools’ graduating classes.24 For the balance of each entering class, the university considers applicants based upon a wide range of factors, one of which is race. Abigail Fisher—an unsuccessful
applicant—challenged the latter portion of the university’s
admissions program, arguing that it violated her and other
Caucasian applicants’ equal-protection rights.
The case reached the Supreme Court the first time three
years ago. On that occasion, the Court voted 7-1 to remand to
the Fifth Circuit. The justices concluded that, contrary to the
rigorous demands of strict scrutiny, the lower court had inappropriately deferred to the university’s choice of means for
achieving its goal of having a racially diverse student body. On
remand, the Fifth Circuit ruled in the university’s favor.
With Justice Kennedy leading the four-member majority in
this second wave of the litigation, the Court affirmed in a narrowly written opinion. Emphasizing that the university’s
admissions program “is sui generis” and that there are little
available data to illuminate the degree to which the top-10%
program was itself providing the university with satisfactory
racial diversity at the time Fisher applied, the Court concluded

that remanding for further fact-finding would have little
upside. “[A] remand,” Justice Kennedy wrote, “would do nothing more than prolong a suit that has already persisted for
eight years and cost the parties on both sides significant
resources.”25 The Court found that the university had articulated clear objectives, that there was at least some evidence
that the top-10% program was not fully achieving those objectives at the time Fisher applied, and that the university had
tried in good faith to identify other, less race-conscious means
of achieving the degree of racial diversity that it deemed educationally desirable. The Court also made it clear, however,
that the university was not forever off the hook. The Court
stressed “the University’s continuing obligation to satisfy the
burden of strict scrutiny.”26 Indeed, Justice Kennedy wrote
that, by continually evaluating the data it had begun to gather
in response to this long-running litigation, the university “has
a special opportunity to learn and to teach” regarding the
impact of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education.27 Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas in
dissent,28 Justice Alito charged the majority with failing to
insist that the university carry the heavy justificatory burden
that strict scrutiny imposes.

21.
22.
23.
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.

[T]he Court voted
4-3 . . . to
uphold the
University of
Texas’s efforts
to increase
racial diversity
among its
undergraduates.

136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016).
Id. at 1307.
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
The Texas legislature adopted the top-10% program in the late
1990s in response to earlier Fourteenth Amendment litigation
against the university. As the Court pointed out, there is no doubt
that the state adopted that program—at least in part—for raceconscious purposes, but Fisher did not challenge it.
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EQUITABLE TOLLING

In a unanimous ruling penned by Justice Alito, the Court in
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States29 rejected a
tribe’s request for equitable tolling of the six-year statute of
limitations imposed by the Contract Disputes Act of 1978. The
parties and the court below had agreed that the appropriate
test for evaluating the tribe’s request was laid out in the Court’s
2010 ruling in Holland v. Florida: equitable tolling is appropriate only if the claimant “establishes two elements: ‘(1) that he
has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented
timely filing.’”30 Three features of the Menominee Indian Tribe
ruling are likely to be of broad interest. First, the Court
explained that Holland articulates two essential considerations,
such that neither can be ignored or discounted even when the
arguments for the other are particularly strong. Second, the
Court said that the “extraordinary circumstances” inquiry
focuses on “matters outside [the claimant’s] control.”31 Third,
Justice Alito dropped a footnote observing that Holland was a
habeas case, that the Court has never held that Holland governs
all equitable-tolling requests outside the habeas context, and
that there was no need here to decide whether Holland applies
in non-habeas cases because (a) the tribe could not even meet
Holland and (b) the tribe had not argued that a more lenient
test was appropriate.

Id. at 2209.
Id. at 2209-10.
Id. at 2214.
Justice Thomas also filed a one-paragraph dissent, reiterating his
opposition to race-conscious admissions policies.
29. 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016).
30. Id. at 755 (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)).
31. Id. at 756 (internal quotations omitted).

ERISA

Section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) states that the fiduciaries of a covered
plan may sue a participant for “appropriate equitable relief . . .
to enforce . . . the terms of the plan.”32 In Montanile v. Board of
Trustees of the National Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan,33
a participant in a covered health-benefits plan was injured by a
drunk driver, prompting the plan to pay significant medical
costs. After the participant obtained a sizable settlement from
the driver’s insurance company, the plan sued the participant
to enforce his contractual obligation to reimburse the plan for
the costs it had paid. The Court held that, to the extent the
participant had already dissipated the settlement funds by
spending them on nontraceable items (like food or travel), the
relief that the plan sought was not “equitable” in nature and so
could not be enforced under Section 502(a)(3). Examining
“standard equity treatises,” the Court found that, before 1938
(when the law and equity courts merged), “a plaintiff could
ordinarily enforce an equitable lien only against specifically
identified funds that remain in the defendant’s possession or
against traceable items that the defendant purchased with the
funds (e.g., identifiable property like a car).”34 In a short dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court’s “bizarre” ruling
was the outgrowth of a poorly reasoned decision that the Court
handed down more than a decade earlier.35
FALSE CLAIMS ACT

In Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States,36 a mental-health facility operated by Universal Health Services had
submitted Medicaid claims for counseling services that it provided for a teenage girl. After the girl died due to complications from a medication that the facility had prescribed, the
girl’s mother and stepfather learned that some of the employees who provided mental-health treatment to the girl and others were unlicensed to do so. The mother and stepfather filed
a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, relying upon an
“implied false certification” theory of liability. They alleged
that, when seeking reimbursement from the federal government, Universal Health had represented that specific types of
professionals provided specific types of services but failed to
reveal its noncompliance with state licensing laws and other
legal requirements. Led by Justice Thomas, the Court unanimously rejected Universal Health’s contention that the plaintiffs’ claim should be dismissed. The Court held that False
Claims Act plaintiffs can rely upon the implied certification
theory when both (1) the defendant’s claim for federal reimbursement “does not merely request payment, but also makes
specific representations about the goods or services provided,” and (2) “the defendant’s failure to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or contractual

32.
33.
34.
35.

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)
136 S. Ct. 651 (2016).
Id. at 658.
Id. at 662 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing Great-West Life &
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002)).
36. 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016).
37. Id. at 2001.

requirements makes those
representations misleading
half-truths.”37
FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Particularly when
“important human
values” are at
stake, . . . the
emergence of new
facts can change
a previously
presented claim
. . . to render it
a new claim for
claim-preclusion
purposes.

CLAIM PRECLUSION
As described above under
the “Abortion” heading, the
Court struck down two provisions of a 2013 Texas abortion
law in Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt38—one concerning
admitting privileges at hospitals and one concerning the
sophistication of abortion
clinics’ facilities. Before reaching the merits of the clinics’
claims, the Court first had to confront Texas’s argument that
the claims were barred due to some of the clinics’ participation in an earlier, unsuccessful challenge to the 2013 law. Led
by Justice Breyer, the five-member majority rejected Texas’s
argument. The Court first concluded that the attack on the
admitting-privileges requirement did not present “‘the very
same claim’” that the clinics had raised in the prior litigation.39 Particularly when “‘important human values’” are at
stake,40 the Court concluded, the emergence of new facts can
change a previously presented claim to a sufficient degree to
render it a new claim for claim-preclusion purposes. Here,
many clinics had closed following the earlier litigation, and
those closures substantially strengthened the plaintiffs’ claim
by demonstrating the legislation’s consequences. With respect
to the statute’s requirements concerning the sophistication of
the abortion clinics’ facilities, the Court found no merit in
Texas’s argument that the claim was barred because the clinics
could have raised—but did not raise—that claim in the earlier
litigation. “The Court has never suggested,” Justice Breyer
wrote, “that challenges to two different statutory provisions
that serve two different functions must be brought in a single
suit.”41 Justice Breyer said that treating every enacted statute
“as a single transaction” that must be litigated by a challenger
in one fell swoop “would encourage a kitchen-sink approach
to any litigation challenging the validity of statutes,” an “outcome [that] is less than optimal—not only for litigants, but
for courts.”42
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas in a
lengthy dissent, Justice Alito criticized the majority’s conclusions. In these justices’ view, the majority had brazenly allowed
the clinics to relitigate their attack on the admitting-privileges
requirement. It is “a cardinal rule,” Justice Alito wrote, that “a
plaintiff who loses in a first case cannot later bring the same

38. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
39. Id. at 2305 (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748
(2001)).
40. Id. (quoting The Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 24, comment f (1980)).
41. Id. at 2308.
42. Id.
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Plaintiffs . . .
received a
boost from the
Court’s ruling in
Campbell-Ewald
Co. v. Gomez,
although the
boost may
prove to be
fleeting.

case simply because it has now
better
evidence.”43
gathered
Regarding the claim challenging
Texas’s demands concerning the
facilities, Justice Alito insisted that
the clinics had waived that claim by
failing to assert it in the prior lawsuit. Far from being unrelated to
one another, he argued, the clinics’
two claims concerned provisions of
the same bill, justified by the state
on the same grounds, imposing the
same kinds of alleged burdens.44

CLASS ACTIONS
Plaintiffs—particularly those attempting to lead class
actions—received a boost from the Court’s ruling in CampbellEwald Co. v. Gomez,45 although the boost may prove to be fleeting. The plaintiff in that case aimed to bring a class action
against a federal contractor for sending unwanted text messages
in alleged violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.46 Before the plaintiff moved for class certification, and
without admitting liability, the contractor offered to pay the
plaintiff all of the statutory damages to which he alleged he was
personally entitled. The plaintiff rejected the offer. Did the contractor’s settlement offer moot the case? Led by Justice Ginsburg, the Court ruled that a live controversy remained and that
the lawsuit could proceed. Under basic principles of contract
law, Justice Ginsburg explained, the contractor’s rejected settlement offer “remained only a proposal, binding neither [party],”
leaving the parties with the adversity that Article III demands.47
The Court also signaled, however, a strategy by which defendants might try to moot cases in the future: “We need not, and
do not, now decide whether the result would be different if a
defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff’s individual
claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the court then
enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount.”48
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito dissented, arguing that there was no live case or controversy
because the contractor—a multimillion-dollar company—had
promised to pay the plaintiff’s personal statutory damages in
full, and it “would be mere pettifoggery to argue that [the contractor] might not make good on that promise.”49 Picking up
on the question that the majority had reserved for future resolution, the dissenters stated that, in future cases, defendants
could successfully get around the problem of rejected settlement offers simply by handing over a sum of money sufficient
to cover all of the plaintiff’s claimed damages.
Class-action plaintiffs prevailed in Tyson Foods, Inc. v.

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 2335.
Id. at 2341 (Alito, J., dissenting).
136 S. Ct. 663 (2016).
In addition to the ruling recounted above, the Court held that,
when they do work for the federal government, contractors do
not share the government’s qualified immunity.
47. Id. at 670. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, preferring
to ground the Court’s reasoning in the common-law doctrine of
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Bouaphakeo.50 In that case, employees at a pork-processing
plant sued for unpaid overtime compensation, arguing that
donning and doffing protective equipment was integral to their
jobs and that the time they spent on those tasks pushed their
total hours worked beyond 40 per week. The amount of time
that each employee spent donning and doffing the equipment
varied, but—based upon observations of some employees—an
expert witness for the class had calculated the average amount
of time that those activities consumed. The employer resisted
certification of the class, arguing that the time variances among
employees rendered the plaintiffs’ claims too dissimilar to warrant class-wide resolution. In an opinion by Justice Kennedy,
the Court ruled that class certification was appropriate. The
Court relied heavily upon the fact that the employer had failed
to keep records of the time that each employee spent donning
and doffing the equipment. In light of that failure, the Court
said, employees suing individually would have been entitled to
rely upon the expert’s calculations when attempting to prove
the amount of time that they individually had spent on those
tasks. If employees could rely upon those calculations when
suing individually, the Court said, then they could rely upon
them when suing as a class.
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
Writing for a unanimous Court in Americold Realty Trust v.
Conagra Foods, Inc.,51 Justice Sotomayor reiterated the Court’s
position that, for diversity-jurisdiction purposes, an unincorporated entity’s citizenship is determined by the citizenship of
all of its members—including, here, the shareholders of an
unincorporated real-estate investment trust. The Court
rejected the suggestion that any entity that has the word
“trust” in its name “possesses the citizenship of its trustees
alone, not its shareholder beneficiaries as well.”52
STANDING
In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,53 the Court elaborated on the “concreteness” inquiry that Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement necessitates when evaluating whether a plaintiff has
standing to sue in federal court. Spokeo provides an online
search engine that offers information about individuals.
Thomas Robins sued Spokeo under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA), alleging that Spokeo provided inaccurate information about his marital status, his age, his employment status, and other matters, and that Spokeo was thus liable for
damages under the FCRA. The Ninth Circuit held that Robins
had standing, but, in an opinion by Justice Alito, the 6-2 Court
remanded for further consideration of the issue.
Justice Alito explained that, while the Ninth Circuit had
properly asked whether Robins had alleged a “particularized”

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

tenders rather than in modern contract-law principles.
Id. at 672.
Id. at 680 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).
136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016).
Id. at 1016.
136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).

injury—that is, an injury that he had personally suffered—it
failed to ask whether Robins’s alleged injury was sufficiently
“concrete.” To satisfy the concreteness requirement, the Court
said, Robins’s alleged injury “must be de facto; that is, it must
actually exist.”54 Even if Spokeo violated the FCRA when presenting inaccurate information about Robins, therefore,
Robins could sue in federal court only if Spokeo’s alleged statutory violation harmed him or created a “material risk of
harm.”55 It might violate the FCRA to inaccurately report a
person’s zip code, Justice Alito explained by way of example,
but, absent other facts in such a case, “[i]t is difficult to imagine how” that error would harm the person.56 Joined by Justice
Sotomayor, Justice Ginsburg dissented, arguing that a remand
was unnecessary because Robins had already alleged facts
establishing a sufficiently concrete injury in the form of damage to his efforts to secure a job.
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT

In a per curiam opinion, the Court in V.L. v. E.L.57 ruled that
the Alabama Supreme Court had unconstitutionally failed to
afford full faith and credit to a Georgia superior court’s ruling.
The Georgia court had entered an adoption decree allowing the
non-birth partner in a lesbian couple to adopt her partner’s natural child. After the family moved to Alabama, the couple’s
relationship ended, and the natural mother allegedly refused to
allow her former partner to visit the child. Faced with a petition for visitation rights, the Alabama Supreme Court held that
the Georgia superior court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the adoption decree and that the non-birth parent
thus had no legal right to visitation. The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed. While it is true that a state court need not afford full
faith and credit to a judgment issued by a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, the justices said, there is a strong presumption that the prior court did have subject-matter jurisdiction, and that presumption had not been overcome here.
In Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt,58 the Court held
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause barred Nevada from
“award[ing] damages against California agencies under Nevada
law that are greater than it could award against Nevada agencies
in similar circumstances.”59 By adopting “a special rule of law
applicable only in lawsuits against its sister States,”60 Justice
Breyer wrote for the majority, Nevada had evinced impermissible hostility to California and its sovereign prerogatives.
JURIES

Suppose a federal trial judge discharges a jury in a civil case
and then, moments later, realizes that an error of some sort has
been made in the jury’s verdict. Does the court have the power
to rescind its discharge order and reassemble the jury for additional work? In Dietz v. Bouldin,61 the Court ruled 6-2 that it
does. The jury in Dietz had awarded the plaintiff no damages,

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 1548 (internal quotation omitted).
Id. at 1550.
Id.
136 S. Ct. 1017 (2016).
136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016).
Id. at 1281. As noted in this article’s introductory paragraph, the

even though the parties had stipu[T]he Court held
lated that the defendant was liable
that, in civil
to the plaintiff for damages
exceeding $10,000. The court
cases, district
realized the error minutes after
courts possess
discharging the jury, a period of
the inherent
time in which one juror had
already left the courthouse. The power to rescind
district court brought the jurors discharge orders
back and asked them to correct
the mistake. Affirming the Ninth and recall juries
Circuit, the Court held that, in to correct errors
civil cases, district courts possess in their verdicts.
the inherent power to rescind discharge orders and recall juries to correct errors in their verdicts.
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor emphasized that—
given the risk that jurors will be tainted by their contacts with
the outside world—judges should exercise this power with caution. Among the factors that a district court ought to consider
are whether jurors have spoken with non-jurors; whether jurors
have overheard conversations among non-jurors about the
strength of the evidence; the length of time separating the discharge and the recall; whether the verdict was met with a discernable emotional response in the courtroom; and whether
jurors have accessed their smartphones or other Internet-connected devices. The Court emphasized that it was not deciding
here whether district judges possess a comparable power in
criminal cases. Joined by Justice Kennedy in dissent, Justice
Thomas endorsed a bright-line rule barring any use of the jury
once it has been discharged.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT

Zubik v. Burwell62 initially appeared likely to produce one of
the most legally and politically controversial rulings of the
year. The Court had been slated to decide whether the federal
government violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA) when it required a set of employers to provide
their female employees with health-care coverage for all FDAapproved forms of birth control—including such things as
intrauterine devices, which prevent a fertilized egg from
implanting in the uterus—unless those employers declared
their religiously grounded opposition in a form submitted to
the government or to their insurers. The employers challenging the requirement claimed that, in violation of RFRA, the
federal scheme substantially burdened the exercise of their
religion without adequate justification. In these employers’
view, the federal regulations required them to be complicit in
providing women with access to birth-control methods that
were equivalent to abortion.
Although those of us outside the Court cannot be certain, it
is possible that Justice Scalia’s death in February 2016, reduc-

justices split 4-4 on whether to overrule its precedent allowing a
state to be sued without its consent in the courts of other states.
60. Id. at 1283.
61. 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016).
62. 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
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ing the Court from nine members to a tie-susceptible eight,
influenced the justices’ disposition of the case. The attorneys
presented their oral arguments
on March 23, 2016. Six days
later, the Court issued an order
requesting additional briefing
on whether a regulatory
arrangement that the justices
proposed—one that would not
require the employers to submit a form setting the birth
control-coverage process into
motion—would be acceptable
to the parties. After the
employers and the government
responded favorably to the
Court’s suggestion, the justices voted unanimously not to
address the merits of the employers’ RFRA claim. Instead, in a
per curiam ruling, the Court vacated the lower courts’ decisions and remanded for further proceedings, expressing its
expectation that the courts of appeals would “allow the parties
sufficient time to resolve any outstanding issues between
them.”63 Joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor filed a
concurring opinion, urging the lower courts not to draw any
inferences from the Court’s actions about the justices’ assessment of the merits of the employers’ RFRA claim.

Justice Breyer
explained [that]
retaliation based
upon mistaken
beliefs can deter
employees from
engaging in
constitutionally
protected activities
just as surely as
retaliation based
upon accurate
perceptions.

SECOND AMENDMENT

In a per curiam decision, the Court in Caetano v. Massachusetts64 rejected the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’s
reasons for upholding a state ban on stun guns. Contrary to the
Court’s reasoning in 2008’s District of Columbia v. Heller,65 the
Massachusetts court had relied upon the fact that stun guns
were not commonly used at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification and the fact that stun guns are not useful in
modern military warfare. The Court remanded the case for a
proper application of the law. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Alito (joined by Justice Thomas) argued that, rather than
remanding, the Court simply should have ruled that the possession of stun guns is constitutionally protected because those
weapons are “commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for
lawful purposes today.”66
SPEECH

Suppose you work for a state or local government and your
supervisor believes—contrary to fact—that you have exercised
your First Amendment freedoms of speech and political association in a particular way. If your employer retaliates against
you based upon its misperception, do you have a Section 1983
action against it? Under the Court’s 6-2 ruling in Heffernan v.

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 1560.
136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016).
544 U.S. 570 (2008).
Caetano, 136 S. Ct. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment)
(emphasis omitted).
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City of Paterson,67 you do. Jeffrey Heffernan, a police officer,
alleged that he was given a less desirable work assignment
because his supervisors mistakenly believed he was supporting
the incumbent mayor’s opponent in an upcoming election. In
an opinion written by Justice Breyer, the Court held that
[w]hen an employer demotes an employee out of a
desire to prevent the employee from engaging in political activity that the First Amendment protects, the
employee is entitled to challenge that unlawful action
under the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983—
even if, as here, the employer makes a factual mistake
about the employee’s behavior.68
After all, Justice Breyer explained, retaliation based upon
mistaken beliefs can deter employees from engaging in constitutionally protected activities just as surely as retaliation based
upon accurate perceptions. Joined by Justice Alito in dissent,
Justice Thomas argued that Heffernan’s claim should fail
because Heffernan had not actually exercised his First Amendment right to speak in favor of (or to associate with) the
mayor’s political opponent.
TITLE VII

Under a regulation promulgated by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, a federal employee wishing to sue
for employment discrimination under Title VII must first consult with an Equal Employment Opportunity counselor. The
regulation requires the employee to contact the counselor
“within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of personnel action, within 45 days of the
effective date of the action.”69 Resolving a circuit split, the
Court ruled in Green v. Brennan70 that, for a constructive-discharge claim, “the matter alleged to be discriminatory” includes
the employee’s resignation, with the result that the 45-day limitations period begins to run on the day the employee resigns.
Of potentially broader interest is the disagreement among
the justices about whether Title VII creates a freestanding
cause of action for constructive discharge. Led by Justice
Sotomayor, a majority of the Court concluded that it does. Justice Thomas argued in dissent that, rather than create an independent legal claim, the doctrine of constructive discharge was
designed merely to broaden the range of remedies that employees who have quit their jobs may seek when complaining of
workplace discrimination. Concurring in the judgment, Justice
Alito staked out a middle-ground position. In his view, the
doctrine permits an independent cause of action “when an
employer subjects an employee to intolerable working conditions with the specific discriminatory intent of forcing the
employee to quit.”71 Absent such intent, Justice Alito wrote,
the constructive-discharge doctrine only ensures that, when
suing an employer for discriminatory acts, an employee who
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136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016).
Id. at 1418.
29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1).
136 S. Ct. 1769 (2016).
Id. at 1785 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).

has quit his or her job “can recover, as damages for the underlying discrimination, all damages that would be available for
formal discharge but which are normally unavailable to
employees who voluntarily quit.”72
In CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC,73 the Court unanimously ruled that a Title VII defendant can qualify as a “prevailing party” within the meaning of Title VII’s fee-shifting provision74 even when a district court’s dismissal of the action
against it is grounded in legal reasons having nothing to do
with the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. The Court declined to
say—and thus left for possible determination on remand—
whether a Title VII defendant can be a prevailing party for feeshifting purposes if the favorable judgment that it obtains does
not preclude further proceedings.
OTHER NOTABLE RULINGS

In a terse per curiam ruling in James v. City of Boise,75 the
justices reminded the Supreme Court of Idaho that state courts
are bound by the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations of federal statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the fee-shifting
statute at issue here.
In Sheriff v. Gillie,76 the Court unanimously found no violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act when, pursuant
to Ohio law, special counsel retained by the state’s attorney
general used the attorney general’s letterhead to communicate
with debtors who owed money to the state for such things as
unpaid university tuition and medical bills.
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning,77
the Court held that Section 27 of the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act—a provision that gives federal district courts exclusive
jurisdiction of all suits “brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by [the Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder”78—establishes the same jurisdictional test that courts
deploy when determining whether a case “arises under” federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
In OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs,79 the Court held that a
suit against an Austrian-owned railway was barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The plaintiff had purchased a
Eurail pass in the United States, then was injured while trying
to board a train in Austria. Rejecting the plaintiff’s contention
that the statute was not an obstacle because her claim was
“based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States,”80 the Court found that “the conduct constituting the
gravamen of [the plaintiff’s] suit plainly occurred abroad.”81
Focusing once again on geographic concerns, the Court
held in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community82 that some of

72. Id. at 1787 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation and brackets omitted).
73. 136 S. Ct. 1642 (2016).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k).
75. 136 S. Ct. 685 (2016).
76. 136 S. Ct. 1594 (2016).
77. 136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a).
79. 136 S. Ct. 390 (2015).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
81. OBB Personenverkehr AG, 136 S. Ct. at 396.
82. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).

the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act’s provisions have an extraterritorial reach but that private parties
have a cause of action under that legislation only if they have
suffered injuries within the United States.
In Bank Markazi v. Peterson,83 the Court held that Congress
did not violate the separation of powers when it enacted legislation aimed at helping to ensure that specified assets would be
available to satisfy the plaintiffs’ judgments against the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Joined by Justice Sotomayor in dissent, Chief
Justice Roberts argued that “Congress has decided this case by
enacting a bespoke statute tailored to this case that resolves the
parties’ specific legal disputes to guarantee respondents victory.”84
In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,85 the Court unanimously ruled that, when determining whether to award attorney’s fees in copyright cases, a district court should give substantial (but not exclusive) weight to the objective reasonableness of the legal position that the losing party took.
LOOKING AHEAD

The fact that the Court will continue to have a tie-susceptible total of eight members when the October 2016 Term begins
has not deterred the justices from placing a large number of
broadly significant civil cases on its docket. In the coming
Term, the Court will aim to bring clarity to numerous issues,
including (among others) the permissible role of race in drawing legislative districts;86 the power of federal courts to confer
citizenship as a remedy for equal-protection violations, and the
distinctions that Congress may and may not make when determining the citizenship of children born abroad to American
citizens;87 the power of a federal appellate court to review a
district court’s denial of class certification;88 the statutory preconditions for holding an executive office in an acting capacity;89 the power of a state to exclude churches and other religious organizations from a program aimed at installing safety
flooring on playgrounds;90 and the kind of injury required to
obtain relief under the Fair Housing Act.91
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Distinct issues regarding race are presented in two separate cases:
Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections (No. 15-680) and
McCrory v. Harris (No. 15-1262).
Lynch v. Morales-Santana (No. 15-1191).
Microsoft Corp. v. Baker (No. 15-457).
NLRB v. SW General (No. 15-1251).
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Pauley (No. 15-577).
Distinct Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami (No. 15-1111)
and Wells Fargo & Co. v. City of Miami (No. 15-1112).
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